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Abstract 
 
IT platforms as the foundation of digitized 
processes and products are vital in a digital economy. 
However, many companies’ platforms are liabilities, 
not strategic assets because of their complexity. 
Consequently, companies initiate IT complexity 
reduction programs. But these technology-centric 
programs at best provide temporary relief. Soon after, 
companies’ platforms become just as complex as 
before. Based on four case studies, we identify three 
non-technical drivers of platform complexity: (1) 
Lacking awareness of consequences business decisions 
have on platform complexity, (2) Lacking motivation to 
avoid platform complexity, (3) Lacking authority to 
protect platforms from complexity. We propose 
measures to address these drivers that can help 
achieve more sustainable impact on platform 
complexity: (1) Removing information asymmetries 
between those creating complexity and those dealing 
with complexity, (2) Redefining incentives to include 
long-term effects on platform complexity, (3) 
Redressing power imbalances between those who 
create complexity and those who have to manage it. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
No company can successfully compete in the 
digital age without a working digital platform – the 
infrastructural technologies, software applications and 
data that allow companies to sell products online, to 
automate internal processes, to analyze vast amounts of 
information to make better decisions and, increasingly, 
to build smart, connected products [23, 17]. These 
platforms are viewed as the “digital foundation” of 
companies and have been defined as “the IT 
infrastructure and digitized business processes 
automating a company’s core capabilities.” [19]. 
However, for many large companies, their current 
platforms are more of a liability than a strategic asset. 
Over time, “legacy” systems have grown so complex 
that they stifle companies by making it difficult for 
employees to get things done, by making it 
cumbersome for customers to deal with the company, 
and by forcing managers into ‘flying without 
instruments’ when it comes to steering parts of their 
companies [15, 3 p. 13]. The inability to view a 
customer’s transaction history across different business 
units or having to manually reconcile information 
about customers from different databases are common 
examples of negative impacts of platform complexity. 
As platform complexity eventually results in lost 
revenue or higher costs, companies fight it [3]. 
Referring to “IT or enterprise architecture 
complexity,” researchers have proposed several 
metrics for platform complexity including the size, 
diversity, integration and rate of change of IT artifacts 
on various architectural levels like IT infrastructure, 
applications, and information [1, 20, 8, 21]. 
In reaction to growing complexity, many 
companies initiate IT complexity reduction programs 
[3] addressing one or multiple of these platform 
complexity metrics. For example, Akzo Nobel is 
moving from over 180 different ERP systems to only 
six [7]. Some even attempt to replace existing 
platforms with new, “green field” platforms: Philips is 
replacing its 10,000 systems with a few hundred that 
form their Philips Integrated Landscape [14]. 
Even if they succeed, many of these IT complexity 
reduction initiatives often only provide temporary 
relief. A few years later, after the introduction of new 
products, geographic growth, the addition of new 
channels, most companies find themselves dealing with 
a platform that is just as complex as it was before the 
simplification initiative. But as we are experiencing a 
more and more digital economy, complex digital 
platforms are becoming even more of a liability as 
companies increasingly start to expose their platforms 
via APIs to external parties [22] and platforms start 
featuring as core enablers of smart, connected products 
directly used by customers [23, 17, 16]. 
But how can executives avoid building the next 
complex legacy platform when taking their companies 
into the digital age? Based on in-depth case studies, 
research interviews with executives from other 
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companies, and the experience – even if not 
systematically analyzed – of more than 100 consulting 
projects in the area of IT complexity over the last five 
years, this paper identifies three drivers that lead 
companies to accumulate complexity in their digital 
platforms. The paper also proposes how companies can 
address these three drivers in order to avoid building 
the next legacy platform of the future. 
 
2. About the research   
 
To answer our research question (“how can 
companies avoid building the next complex legacy 
platform?”) we followed a case-based approach. We 
interviewed 35 IT and business executives on their 
challenges on complexity and how they addressed 
them in an exploratory fashion. These interviews 
confirmed the relevance of the issue and provided a 
basis for selecting case studies. We conducted several 
in-depth case studies for selected companies, out of 
which we refer to four in detail in this article. In these 
companies, we interviewed a total of 43 (ING Direct 
Spain: 3, DHL Express: 7, USAA: 17, Royal Philips: 
16) employees from IT and non-IT parts ranging from 
C-level to project management level. We selected the 
companies as they addressed IT platform complexity 
challenges in convincing ways and stood out compared 
to the other companies we had interviewed. They either 
went through situations of growth or change on the 
business side (ING Direct Spain, USAA) that often 
lead to excessively complex IT platforms, but didn’t in 
these cases; or they had highly complex platforms and 
employed measures to avoid this from happening in the 
future (Philips, DHL Express). 
One author and another researcher wrote up 
individual case studies [11, 10, 13, 14] based on 
transcribed interview data. The two authors of this 
article then analyzed them for commonalities across 
cases (see Table 1). The coding categories were based 
on concepts we derived from game-theoretic works [2, 
4, 5, 6]: information asymmetries, incentives, and 
power differentials. Game theory has most often been 
used to explain strategic moves on an inter-company 
level where there is incomplete or asymmetrical 
information. But it can be applied equally to decisions 
within the corporate environment, like the decisions of 
whether and how to deploy new technology [4]. A key 
insight derived from game theory addresses how 
decentralized teams (like IT and non-IT groups) deal 
with proprietary information and bargain with each 
other to reach agreements [2, p. 804]. When those 
teams don’t have equal access to the available 
information, the solutions (or the platform in our case) 
they arrive at will be inefficient. If each bargainer 
knows something relevant that the other does not, such 
as the payoff from a successful agreement, bargains 
that should ideally be struck are likely to be delayed or 
rejected [5, p. 115].  
Power differentials serve to rig the bargaining 
system in favor of the more powerful or 
knowledgeable party – in this case perhaps business 
units (BU) over central IT. And this power differential 
has significant implications: while one party (i.e., 
central IT) has the fuller picture, it may lack the power 
to insinuate that view into the more powerful party’s 
(i.e., the BU’s) decision-making [4, p. 50]. Applying 
game theory helps us redefine the problem of platform 
complexity as an organizational, behavioral and 
management issue, rather than a technical problem.  
After the cross-case analysis, we went back to 
previous single company interviews [9] and existing 
case studies on other companies [12, 18] that were not 
primarily on complexity but covered the topic at least 
in some depth. We did this to identify examples that 
further illustrated or countered our findings, and also to 
extend the range of industries covered. These are 
included in the last column in Table 1.  
 
3. Description of the case companies  
 
Below we introduce the companies and explain 
why we selected them for this research. 
 
3.1. Royal Philips 
  
Royal Philips was founded in 1891 in Eindhoven, 
The Netherlands. In 2013, Royal Philips operated in 15 
Business Groups comprising over 60 Business 
Categories. Each Business Group belonged to one of 
three Sectors: Lighting (e.g., city street lighting, 
automotive lighting, consumer luminaires, etc.), 
Healthcare (imaging systems, integrated healthcare 
solutions, healthcare software, etc.) and Consumer 
Lifestyle (e.g. personal care, household products, 
computer accessories, etc.). With these products, 
Philips served customers in over 100 countries 
clustered into 17 markets (North America, China, etc.).  
Throughout its history, Philips’ products have been 
widely respected. In 2013, Philips was the most 
valuable brand in The Netherlands, with Interbrand 
ranking it 40th among the 100 most valuable brands 
globally. Despite its brand and innovations, Philips’ 
financial performance was flagging early in the new 
millennium. From 2000–2010, Philips lost more than 
40% of its revenue and its profit margin had dropped 
from 25% to 7% after losses in several years. 
On April 1, 2011, Frans van Houten was named 
CEO and tasked with turning around the business with 
the Accelerate! transformation. Financially, the 
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transformation promised EBITA margins of 11–12% 
by the end of 2016 and 10–12% by the end of 2013 
while growing sales at a CAGR of 4–6% between 2014 
and 2016. All mid-term goals for 2013 were reached 
and shareholder’s confidence as its share price had 
doubled since its most recent low point in late 2011. 
One of the key challenges the transformation was 
facing was the large degree of freedom previously 
granted to P&L responsible product managers. This led 
to a proliferation of non-standardized business 
processes supported by more than 10,000 applications. 
For example, Philips was running a total of around 60 
different ERP systems. No wonder Philips found that 
within one sector, it had 17 different ways of sending 
invoices to customers [14] which proved both costly 
for Philips and cumbersome for customers. In 
response, Philips’ new CIO designed a new “green 
field” IT landscape for all of Philips: the so called 
Philips Integrated Landscape (PIL) that supported three 
newly defined globally standardized processes: idea-to-
market (concerned with turning an idea into a product, 
service, software or system, bringing it to the market 
and managing the product lifecycle), market-to-order 
(concerned with marketing the product and generating 
sales orders), and order-to-cash (concerned with the 
processing of an order including, for example,  
fulfillment, distribution, invoicing, payments 
handling). Philips is an example of a company that 
then also had to employ measures to avoid creating the 
next legacy platform despite the targeted growth [14]. 
 
3.2. USAA 
 
Founded in 1922, Texas-based financial service 
provider USAA has grown its product portfolio from 
auto insurance to over 100 P&C and life insurance, 
banking, and investment management products.  
More recently, USAA has also created connections 
between different products by linking them in 
integrated services addressing life events. Life events 
like buying a car or house—or getting married—
involve multiple products such as loans and insurance. 
Introduced in 2010, one of the company’s first 
integrated services targeted the car buying life event, 
allowing members to select, buy (at a pre-negotiated 
price), finance, and insure a car in one seamless 
process. While this made its members’ (this is how 
USAA calls its customers), lives easier, the need to 
integrate can easily create a “spaghetti”-type platform.  
Instead, USAA leveraged a single “customer 
information file” to provide a 360 degree view of the 
customer across products. USAA had managed to 
maintain a manageable platform since its development 
in 1984. Also, USAA invested less than half its IT 
budget in running systems. In 2012, average project 
delivery time was 125 days, which was significantly 
below industry average and a reduction of more than 
50 days from 2009. Ninety-three percent of projects 
were delivered on time, and in 2012 USAA was 
concurrently working on nearly 250 projects. By 2012,  
50% of the functionality in new systems was reused 
from existing components. In 2011, USAA’s 23,400 
employees generated revenues of $19 billion, an 
increase of 6.7% over 2010. Its net profit margin of 
11.2% compared to an industry average of 2.2%. Its 
8.8 million members in 2011 constituted a 10% 
increase over 2010 with a 98% retention rate. USAA 
had long focused on providing an excellent customer 
experience. Its success in this regard was reflected in 
its Net Promoter Scores (NPS): in the 2011 Satmetrix 
Net Promoter Benchmark Study of US Consumers, 
USAA led in the Auto Insurance, Banking and Home-
owners Insurance industries with scores that were at 
least double the industry average scores [10]. 
 
3.3. ING Direct Spain 
  
ING Direct was founded as part of ING Group in 
1997. After Canada, ING Direct Spain had been the 
second country world-wide of ING Direct. 
ING Direct Spain is an example of a company that 
showed strong growth, while keeping its IT platform’s 
complexity at bay. Originally started as a mono-line 
business focused purely on savings accounts, over time 
ING Direct Spain had become a full-service bank. To 
achieve that goal, the direct bank had substantially 
increased its portfolio of products (including loans, 
credit cards, mortgages, life insurance, brokerage 
services, etc.) and channels (including the phone, the 
web, mobile apps, and even 30 branches).  
The increased variety in the product portfolio was 
viewed as creating value for ING Direct Spain: In 
2011, ING Direct Spain reported 77 million EUR in 
profits before tax (a 9-year CAGR of 28%) and 2.41 
million customers (a 9-year CAGR of 16%), of which 
more than 700,000 used ING Direct Spain as their 
main bank.  Citing the Association of Spanish Banks, 
ING Direct Spain took pride in being the “leading 
direct bank in Spain,” with managed funds that totaled 
29.9 million EUR and 940 employees.  
At the same time, operating fixed-cost per 
customers had grown by only 20% since 2005. An IT 
cost benchmark performed by an independent 
consulting firm revealed ING Direct to be best-in-class 
in the Spanish market. Its cost per account had dropped 
by 25% between 2008 and 2011. Also in terms of total 
operations cost per account, ING Direct Spain 
continued to be very efficient. One benchmark 
compared ING Direct Spain’s costs per account to ten 
Eastern & Central European banks that were deemed 
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comparable in terms of scale. ING Direct Spain’s costs 
per account were somewhat below the average of the 
top three banks in the sample which was less than half 
of the cost of the average performers in the sample and 
a third of the average Iberian bank [11]. 
 
3.4. DHL Express 
  
In 2012, DHL Express (“the most international 
company on earth”) was one of four divisions of 
Deutsche Post DHL (DPDHL). DHL Express’ 100,000 
employees transported 1.6 million packages each day 
for the company’s 2.6 million customers. Although all 
four divisions were profitable and all had revenues 
ranging between €13 and €16 billion, the Express 
division contributed more than 40% of the group’s 
profit. DHL Express had become profitable in 2010 
and enjoyed 8.7% Return on Sales in 2012. 
But that hadn’t always been the case. From 2004–
2008, the losses in the US alone grew at an annual rate 
of 24%, eventually topping $1 billion. As one of the 
levers to turn around the business, the company had 
introduced a set of global business and technology 
standards known as Express Global Application 
Portfolio or EGAP. Moving the US business to the 
global standard meant replacing the current 
international shipping processes and supporting 600 
systems with around EGAP processes supported by 
around 145 systems. Examples of the issues created by 
non-standardized processes and systems were that 
employees could not be deployed globally and 
information of global customers was dispersed.  
But even if all regions conformed to a common 
standard, the challenge was an ongoing one: how to 
maintain a truly global standard. Especially with DHL 
operating in 220 countries and territories, changing 
regulations and pressures for modifying the global 
standard in order to serve local customers better came 
up regularly. And with 100,000 employees, ideas for 
improving standard practices popped-up everywhere.   
We selected the DHL Express case for this research 
as the company developed mechanisms to deal with 
requests for changes to the global standard, i.e. aiming 
at avoiding a future increase in complexity [13]. 
 
4. Findings: 3 drivers of platform 
complexity and how to counter them 
 
Our case companies employed technical and non-
technical practices to address platform complexity for 
the long term. The technical practices aimed for “smart 
design” of their IT platforms (e.g., designing for re-
use, for decoupling, for configuration instead of 
customization). The idea underlying these practices is 
that following certain design principles will lead to IT 
platforms that will be less complex and that will be 
able to “absorb” complexity caused by increasing and 
changing business requirements.  
We built [an auto insurance system] entirely for the 
web, but because we used good design […] and 
good business rules isolation, it was very easy to 
send it to the phone. It was also very easy to put a 
new line of business on that system because the 
rating was separate from underwriting, which was 
separate from the presentation. —James S. Kuhn, 
SVP, Project Delivery, USAA 
 
But designing systems technically for lower 
complexity isn’t enough. In the long term, other factors 
seem to matter at least as much as – if not more than – 
engineering design principles.  
[The biggest risk] is that business reverts back into 
the “I want this, you [IT] go and do it” mode, the 
old pecking order. […] It’s not that people don’t 
buy in on the logic, I think they do. They revert 
back to their old behaviors, because they are 
deeply ingrained. So the biggest obstacle is 
mindset.  —Jeroen Tas, EVP and CIO, Philips 
 
We identified three non-technical drivers that cause 
companies to incur complexity in their IT platforms – 
none of which have to do with the technology itself, 
but rather with those who create and manage the 
complexity and their decision making, i.e, people and 
their behavior (see Table 1). 
 
4.1. Lack of awareness of the consequences 
business decisions have on platform complexity  
  
Customer service employees dealing with 
customers who have to log in multiple times to access 
different products, operational-level employees having 
to enter the same data multiple times, IT people having 
to maintain hundreds of intertwined IT systems – they 
all experience the impact of platform complexity every 
day. And they can predict the consequences of 
introducing yet another product modification, or of 
opening the new mobile channel on IT complexity 
pretty well. Product managers, who are adding “only 
one more product” cannot. This mismatch between 
those creating complexity (with the best intentions) and 
those having to deal with it is a source of complexity.  
When [the product departments] design a product, 
they might make complex things, then people for 
example in customer service will suffer and the 
customer will suffer.  Or we put together something 
that is operationally so complex that it will produce 
complaints in the future.   —Daniel Llano  
 EVP Products & Strategy, ING Direct Spain 
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Table 1: Mapping the drivers of platform complexity and their counter-measures to our cases 
Drivers of digital 
platform complexity /  
 measures to 
address each driver Royal Philips [14] USAA [10] 
ING Direct 
Spain [11] 
DHL Express 
[13] Other examples 
Lack of awareness of 
the consequences 
business decisions 
have on platform 
complexity 
  Creating 
transparency by 
removing information 
asymmetries between 
those creating 
complexity and those 
having to deal with 
complexity 
Cross-functional 
trainings. 
 
Multi-disciplinary 
teams including IT. 
 
Provide anecdotal 
evidence of 
complexity cost 
[see quote P1 
below, not included 
in table due to 
space limitation] 
 
 
IT architects 
engaged in every 
significant project, 
helping 
communicate 
impact on IT 
platform. 
 
Regular job 
transfers between 
departments. 
 
IT reporting 
regularly on 
metrics like re-use 
IT employees 
involved early 
on in cross-
functional 
teams in 
product dev. 
[I1, I2, I3] 
 
Onboarding 
new hires 
always 
involved a 
short “tour of 
duty” in every 
dptmnt. [I4] 
Regular “audits” 
by cross-
functional team 
including site 
visits that 
communicate 
standard 
compliance to 
each unit. [D1] 
IBM: regular job 
transfers 
between 
departments [9] 
  
Pharma 
company: CIO 
uses mobile app 
to show business 
the number of 
apps already 
maintained for 
the unit 
Lack of motivation to 
avoid complexity in 
digital platforms 
  Redefining 
incentive systems to 
include long-term 
impacts on the 
complexity of digital 
platforms 
Move beyond 
individual business 
cases to enterprise-
wide thinking (and 
establish in decision 
making criteria for 
starting projects) 
[P2, P3] 
 
Overarching 
mission (“financial 
security of 
members”) used to 
resolve 
operational trade-
offs [U1, U2] 
 
Company reward 
system paying out 
same percentage 
bonus (after 
reaching personal 
goals) 
 
IT has 
demonstrated 
savings in cost 
and time of 
platform use that 
business actively 
protects platform. 
[U3] 
Set rule: only 
introduce 
products that 
have ‘scale’ 
(potential to 
reach 5% of 
revenues)   
 
Encourage 
enterprise-
wide thinking 
over silo-
thinking (e.g., 
executives 
modeling that 
behavior)  also 
reflected in 
remuneration 
system [I5-7] 
 
Overriding 
goal beyond 
financials: 
superior 
customer 
experience. 
Defined process 
for requesting 
changes to 
standard: all IT 
investments 
above 5,000 
Euro have to 
pass through 
multi-step 
process, ending 
at the central 
investment 
committee 
(chaired by the 
CEO) [D2, D3] 
 
Exceptions to 
standards only 
granted for one 
year. 
 
 
Fidelity: Concept 
of technology 
debt [18]  
Lack of authority to 
protect digital 
platforms from 
complexity 
  Removing the 
power imbalance 
between those who 
create complexity and 
those having to 
manage it (like the IT 
unit) 
Reversing burden 
of proof: by default 
business needs to 
use standard unless 
it can prove legal 
requirements or 
customer willing-
ness to pay [P4] 
 
Executive Business 
Process Owners 
(BPOs) part of 
Executive 
Committee 
 
BPOs synchronize 
change requests 
across businesses 
[P5] 
 
Business process 
experts “on the 
ground” ensure 
standards day by 
day [P6] 
IT perceived as 
trusted advisor 
and as being 
ahead of the 
business vision. 
[U4, U5] 
 
Organizational unit 
dedicated to 
“deliver for the 
project, but build 
for the enterprise” 
 
 
Organizational 
forums support 
cross-
department 
collaboration 
(incl. e.g. 
COO, CIO, 
product 
leaders). [I8]    
 
Veto rights by 
other 
departments 
over P&L 
leaders. [I9] 
Global (Supply 
Side) CIO 
member of the 
investment 
committee  
Bayer Material 
Science: 
reversing the 
burden of proof. 
[12] 
 
IBM: reversing 
the burden of 
proof. [O1, O2] 
[9]  
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Large commercial insurers in the US have built up 
a repository of 30,000+ products as a result of not 
having a feedback loop about the resulting burden on 
the organization (underwriters, operations, customer 
service, IT, regulatory services, etc.).  
Looking at companies that have worked hard on 
avoiding excessive platform complexity, one way to 
counter this is to create transparency by removing 
information asymmetries between those creating 
complexity and those having to deal with 
complexity. The following examples highlight 
potential actions: 
• The CIO in one global pharma company 
developed a mobile app to show the number of 
applications per business unit, per business 
processes and sub-processes. When being asked 
by his peers from finance, HR, or sales to build a 
new system, he pulled out his iPad, launched the 
app and asked “Can’t any of your 80 systems do 
that for you?” Providing this feedback made 
business executives aware of the complexity their 
previous demands had created and started a 
healthy discussion about re-using existing systems 
and working on simplification together rather than 
making it an IT issue. Within three years, the 
company moved from 4100 to 3000 applications. 
• ING Direct Spain and USAA successfully employ 
cross-functional teams for product development 
that include IT architects and customer service 
representatives early on. Architects provide input 
on the platform impacts of business requirements 
and propose alternatives with less IT complexity. 
[IT] is helping [the business] to redefine
 requirements.  And this involvement is from 
 the very beginning of the ideation process.  So 
 there’s no mismatch between something that 
 they want to do and what the architecture can 
 deliver because we already challenge, at very 
 initial stages, the business about different 
 approaches, the implication that their 
 requirements might have in the future 
 implementation and maintainability and 
 sustainability of the platform.    
—Enrique Avila, CIO, ING Direct Spain   
And as the head of products at ING Direct Spain 
puts it: “When we start thinking about any 
product, one of the first conversations that we 
have is with IT.  How complex is the process? 
How do you think it will fit into our IT 
architecture? Nobody comes into my office and 
says ‘OK, this is a product I want to launch,’ 
without understanding what will be the impact on 
the whole bank. That can’t happen.” 
• IBM and USAA rotate executives in and out of IT, 
e.g. Pat Toole used to be the CIO and then became 
the leader of a business unit. Those leaders now 
know what complexity does to IBM and act 
accordingly in their new role. 
 
4.2. Lack of motivation to avoid complexity in 
digital platforms 
 
In most companies we studied, the people with 
revenue or profit and loss responsibility had the power 
to make things happen, mostly in favor of what is best 
for their own local unit.  
“Every country manager thinks he’s very special, 
so it’s not just the US. It’s the Japanese and the 
Swiss and the Dutch also. […].”  —Patrick 
Byron, VP Global Billing, DHL Express  
 
And it is difficult to condemn people to act 
according to what they are being evaluated for. But as 
the former CIO of Philips, Jeroen Tas, put it: “Each 
individual business case may make sense from the 
local perspective, but if you add them up at the global 
level […] many of those cases make less sense.” And 
one of his colleagues, Mats Beem, adds “[In the past] 
the argument often was, ‘I spend $100,000 in making 
something special in [our Enterprise Resource 
Planning system]. And I can demonstrate I get 300,000 
back in one year. Why not do this?’” Take all these 
locally optimal actions together that each add just one 
more non-standard database system, or deviate in just 
one more way from the global standard, and you 
necessarily end up with a complex digital platform. 
Some companies we studied reacted by redefining 
incentive systems to include long-term impacts on 
the complexity of digital platforms: 
• At ING Direct Spain and USAA, corporate-wide 
incentives count at least as much as local unit 
incentives, encouraging employees to think about 
enterprise-wide impacts (including on IT) rather 
than just their local impacts. The same companies 
also use multiple, potentially conflicting goals to 
measure success and hold people accountable (like 
profitability and customer satisfaction – the latter 
one is often much more directly impacted by 
dysfunctional and complex IT systems).  
• The improved experience from faster project 
delivery, lower long-term cost of re-usable 
platform components have instilled a “pull” from 
the business side instead of having IT “push” all 
the time: “Because of 10 years of shared 
experiences and shared successes, now these 
business people are the first ones to go, “Oh, 
don’t shortcut, because I want it [the IT system] to 
be around here a long time.”  —Jim Kuhn, USAA 
• Other organizations (Fidelity Investments is one of 
them [18]) have established a concept called 
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“technology debt.” The purpose is to instill some 
level of accountability with the non-IT side of the 
business when making IT-related decisions. Often 
times, the impact of IT-related decisions has a 
long latency, so the IT unit gets left with the 
burden of accumulating complexity over time. To 
offset the negative effect of increasing IT 
complexity, the technology debt can be a jointly 
agreed amount that the IT unit charges the 
business and that is paid off using the benefits 
from the IT-based solution that was put in place by 
the business. IT will then use this fund to unravel 
the complexity over time. While technology debt 
is seemingly reactive as it is charged ex-post, it is 
actually a preventive mechanism. As the business 
starts feeling the weight of the debt, over time, 
they become more conscious in making certain 
technology trade-offs.  
 
4.3. Lack of authority to effectively protect 
digital platforms from complexity 
 
More often than not, the IT unit is seen as an “order 
taker” rather than a thought partner. As a consequence, 
even those standards and policies set up by the IT unit 
to fight complexity are circumvented with exceptions 
or ignored altogether.  But because the IT unit is one of 
those units that feel the impact of complexity every 
day, it can provide valuable input into decision making 
– if they are allowed to and have “a seat at the decision 
making table.” Some companies are hence removing 
the power imbalance between those who create 
complexity and those having to manage it (like IT):  
• The CEO of Bayer Material Science empowered 
the CIO to reduce the variety of ERP systems 
around the globe as part of their “Program One” 
by “reversing the burden of proof”: instead of 
having IT argue with every country manager on 
whether they could adapt to the global company 
standard, by default country managers had to 
adopt the new global standard, unless they could 
prove that deviating from the standard had more 
benefits for the company as a whole than not 
doing so. [12]. At Philips, as well as at IBM, 
business units need to prove a “customer’s 
willingness to pay” for the benefits that cause 
added complexity or legal requirements before 
they are allowed to deviate from the global 
standard: “But if you say it cannot be standard, 
you’d better bring a lawyer, because then it has to 
have a legal or a compliance background.”  —
Mats Beem, SVP, E2E IT Landscape 
Simplification, Philips.  
• Philips introduced Executive Business Process 
Owners (BPOs) who are members of the executive 
committee and are the only ones who can order IT 
changes: “We won’t do anything unless the BPO 
community, acknowledges that this is the right 
thing to do. We’re no longer going to ask some 
guy in some business unit deep down what their 
needs are. No, we are dealing with [the BPO] to 
prioritize what’s going into [the systems]. She or 
he is responsible to make sure he gets the input 
from the [business units]. It used to be the other 
way around: I’m a business unit and I need to go 
and do this.” —Jeroen Tas, EVP and CIO, Philips 
At the same time, Philips is assigning several 
people the role of Business Process Expert who 
are accepted experts in their job and who watch 
out for unnecessary complexity additions: “Real 
learning happens for 90% ‘on the job,’ so you 
need people on the shop floor where the action is 
to actually raise their hands and ask: ‘This is not 
the way according to the standard, why are you 
deviating?’ To get the right level of discipline.”  
—Rob Theunissen, Transformation Leader). 
 
5. Guidelines for practitioners  
 
Probably the most common way of dealing with IT 
platform complexity we’ve found is by addressing it on 
a technical level through the likes of server-
consolidation and application rationalization. But such 
complexity reduction happens ‘after the fact’ and often 
turns into a never-ending task as complexity seeps in 
with ever-increasing and -changing business demands. 
To address platform complexity more sustainably, a 
technical, “reduce complexity after the fact” approach 
needs to be complemented with one that influences 
behavior and seeks to curb complexity before it is 
created. To do so, executives might want to consider 
the three levers we identified (see Table 1): 
1) Address unawareness of the consequences business 
decisions have on the complexity of digital 
platforms. Executives need to create transparency 
by removing information asymmetries between 
those creating platform complexity and those 
having to deal with platform complexity. This is 
best done by bringing those two groups of people 
together. Hence, most of the practices in Table 1 
support creating a common understanding by 
bringing together cross-functional teams including 
IT, product management, customer service etc. The 
call for creating transparency isn’t new: a lot of 
research on IT platform complexity has so far 
focused on transparency by trying to come up with 
extensive metrics for architecture complexity and 
its drivers [1, 20, 8, 21]. Our research supports that 
creating transparency of complexity is a key lever 
to managing it. But it is only one lever. And beyond 
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metrics, decision-makers also need to understand 
the implication of decisions on those metrics.   
2) Create a compelling motivation for avoiding 
platform complexity. Companies can do so by 
setting incentives (or penalties) that consider 
platform complexity. A focus on individual 
business cases and short-term departmental or 
business-unit performance encourages local 
optimization that often increases enterprise-wide 
platform complexity. In contrast, the case 
companies encourage enterprise-wide thinking: by 
adapting their bonus and performance evaluation 
systems, having executives model behavior 
supporting enterprise-optimized decisions, as well 
as setting policies that avoid local benefits while 
risking a more complex platform for everyone. 
3) Redress the power imbalance between those 
creating and those having to deal with complexity. 
Even with cross-functional teams, if e.g., country 
managers always get their way with using e.g., non-
standard systems, little will change in terms of 
platform complexity. Hence, our case companies 
also created and empowered roles charged with 
protecting platforms from complexity (e.g., the IT 
unit, process owners, etc.). Besides being part of the 
operational-level cross-functional teams, the 
respective roles were also included in executive-
level decision-making committees. And policies 
such as “reversing the burden of proof” help turn an 
“upward-battle” against complexity into a situation 
where people have to argue if they want to increase 
complexity – effectively granting more power to 
those having to deal with complexity. 
 
Managing platform complexity in the long run is 
about changing behavior. (This is true even when 
companies outsource platforms or use cloud-based 
platforms: for example, without the appropriate 
incentive systems to drive desired behavior in an 
outsourcing relationship, handing over a complex 
platform will not help. And while software-as-a-service 
platforms can help to limit excessive customization and 
variety within one system, they don’t address 
proliferation in the number of systems unless 
behavioral changes happen in parallel.) 
Companies that go beyond technical approaches to 
complexity management and beyond reducing 
complexity in their platforms ‘after the fact’ – by 
pulling on the three identified people- and behavior-
related levers – will find themselves better positioned 
to compete in the digital age and avoid turning their 
digital investment into their legacy headache of the 
future. We hope that the cases highlighted here inspire 
executives to adopt policies and practices to 
complement their IT complexity reduction efforts. And 
we hope that research on IT complexity will focus even 
more on these behavioral drivers of IT complexity. 
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Appendix: Quotes referenced in Table 1  
 
P1: It was a six-month project just to apply a 
security patch. There are companies that spend less 
than €7,000 on that simple SAP adjustment. At Philips, 
it can be more than triple […] because of the 
complexity. So many connections, so many different 
settings, and highly customized. Now we have to redo 
almost everything to make sure the system runs. 
—Edgar van Zoelen, Sr. Director, Head of Delivery, 
Lighting, Cross sector Digital Enablement, Philips 
 
P2: Each individual business case may make sense 
from the local perspective, but if you add them up at 
the global level and start assessing them in the context 
of our strategy, many of those cases make less sense. 
[…] So we’re building governance around our 
processes and related IT investments. E.g., Pieter Nota 
as the Products Business Model Owner sits in SteerCos 
discussing whether we should allow deviation from the 
model or not. At this stage you have to create that kind 
of discipline […]. It has to come from the top down.” 
—Jeroen Tas, EVP & CIO, Philips 
 
P3: [In the past] the argument often was, ‘I spend 
100K in making something special in SAP. And I can 
demonstrate I get 300K back in one year. Why not do 
this?’ The real question is, why don’t you spend the 
100K in a domain where you can differentiate in the 
marketplace? It’s not about the individual business 
case. It’s about, where should your money, energy, 
effort and brain share go? It shouldn’t go where you 
can never make a difference. —Mats Beem, SVP, E2E 
IT Landscape Simplification, Philips 
 
P4: “The litmus test is: it’s a differentiating 
capability if your customer is willing to pay for it. […]  
But if you say it cannot be standard, you’d better bring 
a lawyer, because then it has to have a legal or a 
compliance background”   —Mats Beem 
 
P5: [IT] won’t do anything unless the BPO 
community, who represent our Markets, Sectors and 
Functions, acknowledges that this is the right thing to 
do. We’re no longer going to ask some guy in some BU 
deep down what their needs are. No, we are dealing 
with [the BPO] to prioritize what’s going into [the 
systems]. She is responsible to make sure she gets the 
input from the markets and sectors. It used to be the 
other way around: I’m a BU and I need this.  —J. Tas 
 
P6: Real learning happens for 90% ‘on the job, so 
you need people on the shop floor where the action is 
to actually raise their hands and ask: “This is not 
according to the standard, why are you deviating?” To 
get the right level of discipline […] The BPE’s [… i]n 
execution they maintain competency levels, drive 
continuous improvement and check execution against 
the standard.   —Rob Theunissen, End2End 
Transformation Leader, Philips 
 
U1: Whether you are the company president, CFO, 
a product manager, or service representative, you have 
to recognize that your loyalty is to the […] members. 
It’s really trying to make sure that your choices and 
decisions provide the most value to your membership. 
And you have competing priorities and performance 
objectives that sometimes conflict […]. You have to 
make sure that the true measure of performance really 
is how well you are taking care of your members.  
—Stuart Parker, EVP & CFO, USAA 
 
U2: This forces enterprise prioritization as opposed 
to functional and narrow decision-making. —Wayne 
Peacock, EVP Member Experience, USAA 
 
U3: Because of 10 years of shared experiences and 
successes, now business people are the first ones to go, 
“Don’t shortcut, because I want it to be around a long 
time.” —James S. Kuhn, SVP, Project Delivery, USAA 
 
U4: Someone that would just walk in [to a meeting] 
and listen for a while wouldn’t necessarily know [who 
5458
  
is who]. […] You have to really take some time and 
pay attention to what they’re doing to identify whether 
they are a technical person or somebody that has a 
business responsibility. —Rickey Burks SVP 
Information Systems Architecture and CTO 
 
U5: In many cases at USAA, the business vision 
lags the IT vision. If it weren’t for […] the IT 
organization, we wouldn’t have been able to make the 
progress we’ve made as quickly, because they’ve been 
[…] building for integration since day one to make life 
simpler and easier for our members.—Wayne Peacock 
  
I1: [IT] is […] helping [the business] to redefine 
requirements.  And this involvement is from the very 
beginning of the ideation process.  So there’s no 
mismatch between sth. that they want to do and what 
the architecture can deliver because we already 
challenge, at very initial stages, the business about 
different approaches, the implication that their 
requirements might have in the future implementation 
and maintainability and sustainability of the platform. 
  —Enrique Avila, CIO ING Direct Spain 
 
I2: Usually, the business comes with many 
requirements.  But maybe only one of them is 
introducing a lot of complexity, or is going to force us 
to make a lot of changes.  Generally, we challenge 
them back and say: ‘If you are able to alleviate a little 
bit of this business requirement, we might offer a 
solution that is more maintainable, more manageable, 
we’ll have it faster, and it will cost you less.’  And most 
of the times they listen very carefully.  —Enrique Avila 
 
I3: You may not know the full complexity in product 
design, but if you design the product, co-operating with 
the Customer Service team, Ops team and IT people, 
then you normally will be closer to lowering the 
complexity. —Daniel Llano, EVP Products & Strategy 
 
I4: They go to every department […],they explain 
how they work and then they see how our values are 
applied in every department.  —Daniel Llano 
 
I5: When we start thinking about any product or 
any process or any new feature to an existing product, 
one of the first things, one of the first conversations 
that we have is with IT.   How complex is this process?  
How do you feel?  How do you think it will fit in our IT 
architecture?  Nobody comes into my office and says 
‘OK, this is a product I want to launch,’ without 
understanding what will be the impact in the whole 
bank.  That can’t happen. —Daniel Llano 
 
I6: When we make a decision about a new product 
for customers, all the departments work very much 
together. We’re all very aware of the difficulties that 
working in silos can have. […] We all have to be 
confident that what we’re doing will benefit the bank 
as a whole and not a single department.—Daniel Llano 
 
I7: In remuneration of employees, it is as important 
to meet the whole bank’s target, as their own targets.  
Global targets are not only financial; we want a given 
Net Promoter Score [and] certain scores in 
satisfactions. So, everybody is aware that success of 
the bank will not only come by doing my job properly, 
but by creating value as a bank.     —Daniel Llano 
 
I8: We strongly believe that as a counterweight for 
the functional structure, we need horizontal integration 
to maintain the culture of mutual challenging.  
—Werner Zippold, COO ING Direct Spain 
 
I9: There is no way that I go to the management 
committee and say: ‘We’re going to do this business 
and we will earn several million euros and it will be 
fantastic for the P&L next year.’ If the people in 
Customer Service or IT don’t see it as compliant with 
our principles, then we will not do it.   —Daniel Llano 
 
D1: We have introduced from the end of last year a 
Global SOP improvement review. It used to be called 
an “audit.” —Ian Sykes, Global Vice President, 
Network Operations Programs, DHL Express 
 
D2: If [s.o.] thinks that there’s a really good idea 
to streamline processes, improve customer experience, 
reduce costs or whatever reason, they have every right 
to submit a change request to the DHL standards 
organization. —Steve Wells, VP,Strategy and Planning 
Head, Global Order to Cash Domain, DHL Express 
   
D3: The investment committee makes decisions on 
application development anything greater than €5,000. 
That’s how tight the governance is. – German 
Valencia, EVP DPDHL IT Services 
 
O1: Take the HR process. I kept hearing, “I can’t 
do that in my country because of the laws, or because 
of the works council, or because that’s not our 
culture.” […] So anytime I heard “There’s a law,” I’d 
say, “Show me. Send me the document.” And I became 
the “prove it to me” person. —Kari Barbar, VP, 
Globally Integrated Enterprise Enablement, IBM 
 
O2: That unique way of pricing, unique way of 
notifying, whatever it might be in a process—if you 
think being unique is important to your business or 
your country, verify that with the client. Here’s how 
you verify it: not only do you ask them does it have 
value, but are they willing to pay for it? —Linda S. 
Sanford, SVP, Enterprise Transformation, IBM 
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